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Inter-national Justice for Them 
or Global Justice for Us?: THE 
U.S. AS A SUPRANATIONAL JUSTICE 
DONOR*  
Margaret M. deGuzman** 
U.S. policy concerning international justice, particularly at 
the ICC, involves case-by-case support when such support is in 
U.S. national interests.  This policy signals that the U.S. 
considers itself a supranational justice donor rather than a 
member of a global justice community committed to enforcing 
shared values. This approach to international criminal justice 
both inhibits global justice efforts and undermines the U.S. claim 
to global moral leadership.  The next U.S. administration should 
assert full membership in the global justice community by 
joining the ICC and providing unequivocal support for all efforts 
to address serious international crimes. 
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I. Introduction 
In one of his relatively few statements about the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), President Obama said: “[W]e are engaging 
with State Parties to the Rome Statute on issues of concern and are 
supporting the ICC’s prosecution of those cases that advance U.S. 
 
* These remarks were prepared for a conference on The International 
Legal Practices of the Obama Administration at Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law on September 18, 2015.  
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M.A.L.D., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; B.S.F.S., Georgetown 
University School of Foreign Service. 
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interests and values, consistent with the requirements of U.S. law.”1 
This statement reflects the U.S.’s “case-by-case” approach to 
supporting international justice efforts.2 Under this policy, the 
administration’s support for international justice depends on a 
situation-specific assessment of U.S. national interests. As then 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton put it, the U.S. will “look for 
opportunities to encourage effective ICC action in ways that promote 
U.S. interests by bringing war criminals to justice.”3 This focus on 
national interests stands in contrast to the approach to supranational 
criminal justice taken in some other parts of the world. For instance, 
the European Union emphasizes the importance of promoting 
“universality” in relation to the ICC.4 Former UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan also highlights the global nature of the enterprise, urging 
all states to “demand that those who claim the mantle of global 
leadership accept the duty of promoting global values.”5   
The contrast between U.S. policy and rhetoric concerning 
supranational justice and those in other parts of the world reflects a 
fundamental open question about the nature of the international 
criminal justice enterprise. That is, it remains unclear whether the 
supranational criminal law regime is intended largely to provide a 
framework for states to assist one another in effectuating national 
justice goals, an “inter-national” justice agenda, or is instead meant 
primarily to reflect and promote global justice norms, a “global” 
justice agenda.   
 
1. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, WHITE HOUSE, 48 (May 2010), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_se
curity_strategy.pdf [http://perma.cc/2BEC-LRLY]. 
2. See Caitlin Lambert, The Evolving US Policy Towards the ICC, INT’L 
JUST. PROJECT (Mar. 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.com/the-evolving-us-policy-
towards-the-icc/ [http://perma.cc/FE5M-ALS7]. 
3. Walter Pincus, Clinton’s Goals Detailed, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/01/18/AR2009011802268.html 
[http://perma.cc/BSA4-ZWZM]. 
4. EU efforts to combat impunity, EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/icc/index_en.htm 
[http://perma.cc/C8SU-QELT] (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) (noting “the 
EU’s ongoing engagement towards the universality of the Rome Statute 
and promoting a better understanding of the ICC’s mandate.”).  
5. Kofi Annan, Address at the First Review Conference of the Assembly of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, Kampala, Uganda (May 
31, 2010) (emphasis added) (transcript available at 
http://kofiannanfoundation.org/newsroom/speeches/2010/05/kofi-
annan-addresses-first-review-conference-assembly-states-parties-to 
assembly-states-parties-to [http://perma.cc/9XHS-3JNU]). 
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This essay argues that the U.S. has chosen a policy that promotes 
a selective “inter-national” justice for others, rather than one that 
signals U.S. membership in a global community committed to global 
justice norms. For the U.S. to support supranational justice only in 
cases that align with U.S. national interests may make sense if the 
regime’s primary goal is inter-national justice assistance. If outside 
support is designed to help ensure that justice is done in the state 
most affected by the crimes at issue, there are good reasons to make 
the investment only when foreign justice advances—or at least does 
not detract from—the interests of the assisting state. On the other 
hand, if the central purpose of supranational justice is to promote the 
norms of a global community, members of the community should 
provide their support whenever possible; that is, whenever the costs of 
support are not too great in relation to the supporting state’s other 
obligations. 
The U.S.’s selective case-by-case approach to supranational justice 
signals that the U.S. views itself as a supranational justice “donor” 
rather than as a leading member of the global justice community. 
Although current U.S. policy certainly suggests greater affinity 
toward the global justice community than did that of the Bush 
Administration, particularly in the latter’s early years, the U.S. has 
not claimed full membership in the community. This approach has 
consequences for the U.S.’s reputation as a global leader and for the 
effectiveness of the supranational justice regime. Remaining outside 
the global justice community undermines the U.S.’s ability to act as a 
global leader in matters affecting the shared moral norms of the 
global community. U.S. exceptionalism in this regard also undermines 
the legitimacy of the ICC and of other global justice actors.  Not only 
is the U.S. withholding its full support from such actors, its case-by-
case policy undermines the very notion that a global justice 
community exists.  If institutions such as the ICC cannot claim to act 
on behalf of a global community, their legitimacy becomes precarious, 
particularly when their actions affect states that have not consented 
to their authority. 
II. Case-by-Case Justice 
The Obama Administration’s rhetoric is not devoid of references 
to global justice values. For instance, President Obama stated that, 
“those who intentionally target innocent civilians must be held 
accountable.”6 This statement can be read as an implicit 
acknowledgement of a global norm requiring accountability for the 
war crime of targeting civilians. The U.S. President has also hinted 
that accountability for serious international crimes is generally in U.S. 
 
6. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 48.  
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interests. For example, as a presidential candidate he stated that, “it 
is in America’s interests that these most heinous of criminals, like the 
perpetrators of the genocide in Darfur, are held accountable.”7   
Nonetheless, the Administration’s policy is to support 
supranational accountability efforts only in cases that align with U.S. 
national interests.  In particular, the Administration seems to regard 
accountability in Africa as aligning with U.S. interests. The U.S. 
provided U.S. military personnel to assist in the capture of notorious 
war criminal, Joseph Kony, who is wanted by the ICC,8 and adopted 
legislation supporting prosecutions of crimes of sexual violence in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.9 President Obama called for Kenyan 
support of ICC prosecutions in that country,10 and the U.S. facilitated 
the transfer to the ICC of Bosco Ntaganda, a warlord wanted for 
crimes committed in the DRC.11  
In contrast, the U.S. has not provided public support to the ICC’s 
efforts to encourage national justice in Colombia. Likewise, the U.S. 
has resisted Palestinian efforts to involve the ICC in that situation.12 
Despite earlier official statements supporting states’ decisions to join 
 
7. Statements of Barack Obama on the International Criminal Court: 
October 6, 2007 responses to candidate questionnaire, AMICC.ORG (Apr. 
18, 2011), http://www.amicc.org/docs/Obama%20on%20ICC.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ZU5T-5QWJ]. 
8. Lord’s Resistance Army and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-172,124 Stat. 1209 (2010); Helene Cooper, More U.S. 
Troops to Aid Uganda Search for Kony, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/world/africa/obama-is-sending-
more-resources-for-joseph-kony-search.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/ERN6-
6XSL]; see also Douglas Dunbar, The Obama Administration’s Evolving 
Policy Towards the International Criminal Court, AMICC.ORG (June 29, 
2011), http://www.amicc.org/docs/ObamaPolicy.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/FQ6X-S7J5]. 
9. Dunbar, supra note 8.  
10. President Obama, Statement on the International Criminal Court 
Announcement (Dec. 15, 2010) (transcript available at  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/15/statement-
president-obama-international-criminal-court-announcement 
[http://perma.cc/9X5M-9XFD]) (“. . . I urge all of Kenya’s leaders, and 
the people whom they serve, to cooperate fully with the ICC 
investigation and remain focused on implementation of the reform 
agenda and the future of your nation.”). 
11. Suspected War Criminal Surrenders in Rwanda, CNN (Mar. 18, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/18/world/africa/congo-war-crimes/ 
[http://perma.cc/K2G8-7S7K]. 
12. Andrew Novak, Why Palestine Has No Chance at the International 
Criminal Court, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 17, 2015), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/04/17/why-palestine-has-
no-chance-at-the-international-criminal-court.html 
[http://perma.cc/97SS-GCBD]. 
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the ICC,13 the U.S. condemned the decision of Palestine’s President 
Mahmoud Abbas to sign the Rome Statute, calling it “counter 
productive”14 and asserting that it does “nothing to further the 
aspirations of the Palestinian people for a sovereign and independent 
state.”15 Indeed, the U.S. has gone so far as to threaten to withhold 
funding from Palestine if Palestine pursues ICC action.16 As Professor 
John Cerone notes, “[t]he US has tended to support international 
criminal courts where the US government has (or is perceived by US 
officials to have) a significant degree of control over the court, or 
where the prosecution of US nationals is either expressly precluded or 
otherwise remote.”17 This case-by-case policy signals that the U.S. is 
not always interested in accountability for international crimes.   
Of course, the most notable example of the U.S. withholding 
support from supranational justice efforts is its failure to become a 
party to the ICC. Indeed, the case-by-case policy effectively precludes 
U.S. membership in the ICC, since membership would require 
unconditional support of the Court’s work. The U.S. justifies 
remaining outside the ICC regime, which has now attracted 123 
member states, on the grounds that the U.S. is the world’s largest 
provider of military assistance around that world, and that ICC 
membership would unduly expose U.S. personnel to ICC jurisdiction.18 
This argument is further evidence of the U.S. government’s failure to 
 
13. Dunbar, supra note 8. 
14. Dunbar, supra note 8. 
15. Ruth Eglash & Carol Morello, Palestinian Leader Mahmoud Abbas 
Moves to Join International Criminal Court, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israel-thanks-us-for-
abstaining-on-security-council-resolution/2014/12/31/9b84cfa8-90d2-
11e4-a412-4b735edc7175_story.html [http://perma.cc/D99V-5JP6]. 
16. Diaa Hadid & Somini Sengupta, Palestinians to Seek War Crimes 
Charges Against Israel at Hague Court, N. Y. TIMES (Jun. 24 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/world/middleeast/palestinians-to-
accuse-israel-of-war-crimes-in-international-court.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/KMN3-H6SW] (noting that the United States 
“provides the Palestinian Authority with about $400 million annually”); 
Benny Tsododo, US Threatening Global Justice, HERALD (Jan. 26, 
2015), http://www.herald.co.zw/us-threatening-global-justice/ 
threatening-global-justice/ [http://perma.cc/7VG2-FG4K] (noting the 
United States’ plan to withhold this funding); see Mark Kersten, The 
US and the ICC: Towards a Closer Relationship?, JUST. IN CONFLICT 
(Apr. 10, 2011), available at http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/04/10/the-
us-and-the-icc-towards-a-closer-relationship/ [http://perma.cc/K5HF-
JNHJ] (providing examples of selective US involvement). 
17. John P. Cerone, Dynamic Equilibrium: The Evolution of US Attitudes 
toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
277, 315 (2007). 
18. President Barack Obama, supra note 10. 
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endorse global community values. If the U.S. shares the values of the 
global community in matters of supranational criminal justice, it 
should implement those values in our national system. It should also 
be open to the possibility that a failure to implement global values 
nationally will be remedied through ICC action.  
In sum, by supporting international criminal justice only when 
such justice aligns with U.S. national interests, and never for crimes 
committed by U.S. nationals, the U.S. has positioned itself as an 
international justice donor rather than a member of the global justice 
community. The next section examines how this approach fits into 
current understandings of the role of supranational criminal law 
institutions. 
III. Inter-national or Global Justice? 
One way to understand the work of international criminal courts, 
in particular the ICC, is as a vehicle for promoting national justice in 
the states most affected by the crimes at issue. Accordingly, 
international courts serve as back-ups for unavailable or inadequate 
national justice systems and should seek to address the justice needs 
of national communities.19 Alternatively, international criminal courts 
can be viewed primarily as vehicles for global criminal justice. This 
option assumes the existence of a global community with values 
shared by a large portion of the world. The enforcement of these 
global values has merit independent of the needs or desires of the 
communities most affected by the crimes. 
These two depictions of the nature of supranational criminal 
justice are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the Rome Statute of the 
ICC reflects an intention to promote both national and global justice. 
The Statute’s preamble suggests that the Court aims to “put an end 
to impunity” for “crimes [that] threaten the peace, security and well-
being of the world,” while various other provisions indicate that the 
Court seeks to address the needs of victims of particular crimes.20 
 
19. Scholars of transitional justice often advance this view. See e.g., Jaya 
Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist 
Process Approach 32 MICH J. INT’L L. 1, 24 (2010) (arguing that 
‘internationalized criminal courts . . . have not fared well in the eyes of 
local populations. The ad hoc tribunals’ failure to incorporate local 
preferences into their design process led to widespread rejection of these 
courts by members of the affected societies.’). See also Jaya Ramji-
Nogales, Bespoke Transitional Justice at the International Criminal 
Court, in CONTESTED JUSTICE: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT INTERVENTIONS, 106-21 (Christian 
DeVos et al. eds., 2015).  
20. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., arts. 15 
(3)(a), 43(6), 54(3)(b), 68(3), 75(3), 82(4), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 
(1998). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
Inter-National Justice for Them or Global Justice for Us? 
183 
Resource limitations, however, require international criminal law 
institutions to prioritize one of these objectives much of the time. For 
instance, the ICC must choose whether to prosecute a wide range of 
crimes and perpetrators to satisfy the greatest possible number of 
victims, or to prosecute select crimes that best represent the global 
values most in need of expression.21 
The rhetoric of state actors articulating policies related to 
supranational criminal justice often reflects their views of the 
dominant role of the relevant institutions. For instance, in a 
statement of support for the ICC, a representative from Norway 
stated, “we believe that the ICC, by combating impunity, will provide 
the international community long term peace making dividends.”22 
Similarly, in recommending ratification of the Rome Statute, 
parliamentarians in the Dominican Republic highlighted the role of 
the ICC in helping to “consolidate the cause of international 
justice.”23  
In contrast, the U.S.’s case-by-case support policy suggests that 
the U.S. views supranational justice as a backstop for unavailable 
national justice systems—a justice aid program.  When it is in U.S. 
national interests, or at least not contrary to those interests, the U.S. 
is willing to provide assistance to ensure that justice is done for mass 
crimes committed overseas. As one commentator notes: “[The U.S.] 
supports ad hoc international criminal justice by special courts and 
tribunals on an ad hoc basis, but is fundamentally opposed to the 
cosmopolitan aspirations of a standing court with a global reach.”24 If 
 
21. See generally Margaret deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive 
Selection in the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265 
(2012) (for a discussion on the selection of cases at the ICC). 
22. EXCERPTS FROM THE 6TH COMMITTEE DISCUSSION OF ITEM 164: 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT/56TH 
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (Nov. 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Norway6thComm12Nov01.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/9WHC-DRL6]. 
23. Nat’l Cong. Dom. Rep., Santo Domingo Plan of Action on the Rule of 
Law & the ICC (October 30-31, 2008), 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/SantoDomingoPlanAction31Oct08_
en1.pdf [http://perma.cc/3ZFD-JRDH]. 
24. KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF WAR 
CRIMES TRIALS 147 (2006), excerpt available at 
https://books.google.com/books?id=Pdgg0EDp-
Q4C&pg=PA180&lpg=PA180&dq=great+britain+global+justice+inter
national+criminal+law&source=bl&ots=7LmRhWokH8&sig=l4YRxUU
_zWLlGDIaM4DHwwwKugc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAGoVC
hMIm9egns_WxwIVhTw-
Ch3Tngoa#v=snippet&q=%22united%20states%22&f=false 
[http://perma.cc/2DEX-JBM9]; see also David Forsythe, The United 
States and International Criminal Justice, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 974, 
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the U.S. considered itself part of a global justice community, it would 
view all violations of that community’s values as threats to the 
wellbeing of the community. It would therefore treat all efforts to 
remedy such violations as being in the national interest. 
If supranational justice is most appropriately understood as a 
form of international assistance to national justice systems, current 
U.S. policy does not threaten the viability of the regime. If, on the 
other hand, supranational criminal law is an effort to build a global 
community and promote its values, the case-by-case policy both 
threatens that project and undermines the U.S.’s reputation as a 
global leader.25 
IV. Consequences of Selective Support for Global 
Justice 
The U.S.’s case-by-case policy threatens the global justice project 
in a number of ways. First, it calls into question the very existence of 
a global community of shared criminal justice values. The idea of a 
global criminal justice community hinges on a presumption in favor of 
accountability for all international crimes. This is not to say that 
criminal prosecutions are mandatory in all cases, but that such 
prosecution is at least considered to be an important interest of the 
global community that should only give way to other interests under 
exceptional circumstances. The U.S. position that accountability for 
international crimes is only sometimes in its national interest 
undermines the cosmopolitan claim of the global justice community. 
Second, providing selective support based on U.S. interests, 
without subjecting U.S. citizens to the ICC’s jurisdiction, suggests 
that international justice is a tool of the powerful against the less 
powerful. This is perhaps the most persistent and damaging 
accusation facing the ICC.26 The problem of selectivity has particular 
 
974(2004) (arguing that “US exceptionalism and commitment to power 
politics” shape the US’ approach to international criminal justice.). 
25. Tsododo, supra note 16 (“By seeking to block Palestinians from 
accessing justice and also threatening the existence of the ICC, the US 
has proved to be a dimming beacon of democracy that is morphing into 
an albatross around the neck of international justice.”). 
26. Moses Kuria, Why Was CJ So Soft on USA And ICC?, STAR (Oct. 13, 
2012), http://www.the-star.co.ke:8080/article/why-was-cj-so-soft-usa-
and-icc [http://perma.cc/8KY9-X7K2]; see David P. Forsythe, ‘Political 
Trials’? The UN Security Council and the Development of International 
Criminal Law, ASHGATE RES. COMPANION INT’L CRIM. L. 496 (William 
Schabas et al. eds., 2013) (“[D]ouble standards obviously persist. China, 
Russia and the United States refuse to ratify ICC arrangements that 
would legally regulate them, but push the ICC on others. Particularly, 
the United States, which has been a major advocate for such measure as 
the UN ad hoc courts and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, has sought 
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force in fueling claims that the ICC is biased against Africans.27  
Indeed, some critics invoke charges of selectivity in urging African 
states to withdraw from the ICC.28 According to one commentator: 
“[i]ts name notwithstanding, the ICC is rapidly turning into a 
Western court to try African crimes against humanity. It has targeted 
governments that are U.S. adversaries and ignored actions the United 
States doesn’t oppose . . . effectively conferring impunity on them.”29 
 
to turn American exceptionalism into legal exceptionalism.”); Richard 
Goldstone, Is the International Criminal Court an Institution with an 
African Agenda?, INT’L JUD. MONITOR (Winter 2012), available at 
http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_winter2012/globaljudicialpersp
ective.html [http://perma.cc/PE2Y-NLKT] (“It is not in the interests of 
international justice that the ICC should have jurisdiction over the 
nationals of the small and weak nations but not those of the large and 
powerful”). 
27. Nick Mangwana, AU- Contradictions and Duplicity of the West, 
HERALD (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.herald.co.zw/au-contradictions-and-
duplicity-of-the-west/ [http://perma.cc/FK8X-6FMH]; Duncan Miriri, 
Uganda’s Musevini Calls on African Nations to Quit the ICC, REUTERS 
WORLD NEWS (Dec. 12, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/12/us-africa-icc-
idUSKBN0JQ1DO20141212 [http://perma.cc/D2TU-EVD4]; see also 
Zaya Yeebo, Pan African perspectives on the ICC, African elections, 
and Western ire, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.php/comment/92741 
[http://perma.cc/7QUJ-GCCX] (referring to the ICC as an example of 
imperialism and Western domination as well as stating “[the ICC] has 
been hijacked by the west, and as a result, is nothing less than a 
neocolonial instrument of manipulation… To put it mildly, the ICC as 
currently constituted, is the stick for African leaders who refuse to 
become willing tools”). 
28. Dr. David Hoile, Why Africa May Leave the ICC, NEW TIMES (July 28, 
2015), http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-07-28/191046/ 
[http://perma.cc/HQ84-8Z4K] (“Broader Western hypocrisy is all too 
evident. The United States has forcefully pointed out that the ICC is a 
kangaroo court, a travesty of justice open to political influence and that 
no American citizen will ever come before it.”); Miriri, supra note 27; 
Peter Kagwanja, How ICC and Security Influenced Foreign Policy, 
DAILY NATION (Dec. 31, 2014), http://mobile.nation.co.ke/blogs/ICC-
Cases-Kenya-Uhuru-Kenyatta-William-Ruto/-/1949942/2574922/-
/format/xhtml/-/m7w7uf/-/index.html [http://perma.cc/FK8X-6FMH] 
(noting Museveni “criticised the ICC for continuing with Ruto’s case 
despite an African Union (AU) resolution that no sitting African Head 
of State or deputy should be tried at the court.  ‘I will bring a motion to 
the African Union’s next session... I want all of us to get out of that 
court of the West’”); Mangwana, supra note 27 (noting that Zimbabwe 
President Mugabe put “pulling out of the ICC on the agenda of the 
June 2015 Summit”). 
29. Kirsten Ainley, The Responsibility to Protect and the International 
Criminal Court: counteracting the crisis, 91:1 INT’L AFF. 37, 42 (2015), 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_pub
lication_docs/INTA91_1_03_Ainley.pdf [http://perma.cc/7P56-7Q73]; 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
Inter-National Justice for Them or Global Justice for Us? 
186 
The ICC is thus charged with being “a neo-imperial project set up to 
try the enemies of the United States, or the inhabitants of Africa.”30 
Accusations of Western manipulation lead some commentators to 
conclude “that the ICC is an inept, corrupt, political court.”31  
More generally, commentators assert that by withholding its full 
support from the ICC, the U.S. undermines the Court’s legitimacy.  
As one author writes:  
Without US participation, the ICC will not only lack the 
support of the most powerful nation on the planet, it will lack 
the legitimacy in international politics that the United States 
could grant with its predominant role in the international arena, 
and a history of being the most vocal proponent for human 
rights within the last century.32  
At a practical level, the absence of U.S. support in enforcing ICC 
arrest warrants undermines the Court’s effectiveness.33 A notable 
example is the failure to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir 
who is the subject of an ICC indictment.34  
The case-by-case policy also undermines the U.S.’s reputation as a 
global leader.  Since members of the global justice community view 
membership as a moral imperative, they are less likely to trust and 
 
see Kersten, supra note 16 (“Where the ICC is useful to the US’s 
political aims, it is used. When it becomes an obstacle or exhausts its 
utility, the US administration has not hesitated to not only reduce its 
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respect states, like the U.S., that remain outside the community.35 If 
the U.S. does not unequivocally support an institution aimed at 
ending impunity for crimes that “threaten the peace, security and 
well-being of the world,” how can it be trusted to lead the world in 
other areas of moral importance, such as respect for human rights?   
V.  Is a Global Justice Policy Possible in the U.S.? 
Supporters of a global justice agenda sometimes suggest that 
although the case-by-case policy may not be ideal, it is the best the 
U.S. can do in light of current national political realities.36 This may 
be true. Moreover, it is also true that the Obama Administration’s 
selective support for the ICC is far better than the prior 
Administration’s early active opposition to the Court.37   
Nonetheless, there is some reason to believe that a global justice 
policy is possible for the U.S.  In particular, surveys of Americans 
consistently show a high level of support for joining the ICC.38  
Admittedly, as one organization supportive of the ICC states: while 
“instinctive support for the Court is broad-based,” such support 
remains “shallow and untapped.”39 Most Americans support the 
general idea of an ICC but are fairly uninformed about the nature of 
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the ICC and the current level of U.S. involvement.40  According to a 
December 2014 study, 64% of Americans know nothing about the 
ICC, as opposed to 15% who know a “great deal or fair amount;” and 
59% do not know whether or not the U.S. is a member.41 Of the 
slightly informed, 63% believe the U.S. is a member of the Court.42 
Nonetheless, the majority of those surveyed who are even slightly 
knowledgeable about the ICC support increased U.S. involvement.43 
Moreover, those who are highly knowledgeable about the ICC are 
often very supportive of the institution.44  
This generally high level of support for the ICC—an institution 
with global reach and mandatory jurisdiction—suggests that many 
Americans would support a policy more consistent with global justice 
values. It may, therefore, be time to challenge the assumption that 
insufficient domestic support exists for joining the ICC, and the global 
justice community more broadly.  
VI. Conclusion 
With a new U.S. Administration coming into office next year, the 
time is ripe to reconsider U.S. policy toward the ICC and other 
international criminal justice institutions. The U.S. should signal full 
membership in the global justice community by joining the ICC and 
providing unequivocal support for all efforts to address serious 
international crimes.   
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